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Abstract
by Wallace E. Huffman and Richard E. Just
This paper presents a conceptual analysis of important issues in management of
agricultural research drawing on principal-agent theory and derives implications for fimding
and management of agricultural research. Building on well known attributes of research,
whereby research results are risky, outputs are uncertain and sometimes imanticipated, more
than one approach has validity for a given topic, we consider how incentives should be
structured to elicit optimal research effort and directions, whether research directions should
be set at a centralized or decentralized level, and the optimal duplication of effort. The
results suggest that (i) the current trend toward replacement of formxila funding by
competitive grants allocationmay be ill conceived, (ii) a mixed systemwith some research
funding anddirection at the federal level, some at the state level, an perhaps some at regional
levels is advantageous, and (iii) fimding of competing scientists working on the same
problem at different institutions has merit.
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Setting Efficient Incentives for Agricultural Research:
Lessons from Principal-Agent Theory
At least since the 1950s, studies have shown unusually high productivity of public agricultural
research(e.g., Griliches; Hufi&ian andEvenson;Ruttan; Schultz). In response, many have asked why
more funds are not allocated to public agricultural research. More recently, following the large
budgetdeficits ofthe 1980s, funding condidons havetightened and forced both the research agencies
oftheU.S. Department ofAgricultureandmanyofthe state agricultural experiment stations (SAES)
into a contractingmode. Under unprecedented budget pressures, administrators and public decision
makers have struggled to set priorities to reduce budgets without significant loss of productivity. In
response, considerable debate has emerged over the last decade about how to manage public
agricultural research (e.g., Alston, Norton, and Pardey; Huffman and Just 1994; Just and Huffman).
One school argues that priorities should be set at a national level and then competitive grant
programs should be used to allocate funds according to these priorities. Another school argues that
national priority setting may ignore research opportunities with local specificity or non-national
groups ofbene&ctors, and that competitive grants programs have high transactions costs and foster
too manyprojects with short-term and relatively certain payoffs. Some limitedempirical work has
beenoffered supporting the latterview (Huffman and Just 1994). Interestingly, the analysis ofthese
issues to date has not produced eitherrigorous empirical or theoretical results. Progress has been
largely to identify issues, canvass views, and express a priori impressions and intuition.
This debate renews a longer-term concernabout how best to foster, organize, andmanage
agricultural research. Almost two decades ago, T. W. Schultz (1980, 1982, 1983, 1985) spoke out
against the tendencies for national priority settingand central planning ofagricultural research, over-
organization of insthutional research, directed research from the top, elaborate
2documentation^ustification of research efforts, andtreating/managing research as a routine activity.
He concluded that "Althoughmon^, facilities and competent agricultural scientists are necessary to
doworthwhile research, it isnot a routine activity. It is, indeed, a subtle, elusive human activity that
is difficult to foster, promote and maintam" (Schultz 1980,p. 16).
Thispaper presents a conceptual analysis of some of these important issues inmanagement
of agricultural research drawing on principal-agent theory. The analysis highlights some of the
characteristics of the public agricultural research establishment whereby research results are risky,
outputs are uncertain and sometimes unanticipated, more thanoneapproach hasvalidity for a given
research topic, etc. The paper derives implications for funding and management of agricultural
research. Based on the identified characteristics, we consider how incentives should be structured
to elicit optimal research efforts and directions, whether research directions should be set at a
centralized or decentralized level, and the optimal duplication ofeffort, for example, by competing
scientists or competing research facilities. Results suggest that (i) the current trend toward
replacement of formula funding by competitive grants allocation may beill conceived, (ii) amixed
system with some research flinding and direction at the federal level, some at the state level, and
perhaps some at regional levels isadvantageous, and (iii) funding ofcompeting scientists working on
the same problem at different institutions under different direction has merit.
Before beginning the conceptual analysis, we first set the stage by reviewing some recent
trends in agricultural research funding and management. Then we introduce the principal-agent
model of decision making in agricultural research along with its asymmetric information
characteristics. Based on the features ofuncertainty affecting agricultural research, we turn to design
ofincentive mechanisms to optimize performance. The resulting fi-amework naturally lends itself to
investigating questions of effort duplication.
3The Changing Structure of Incentives for Agricultural Research
Some dramatic changes have taken place in the funding of agricultural research in the United States
since establishment of the US. Department ofAgriculture, the founding of the land-grant college
system under the Morrill Act of 1862, and the mstitution ofagricultural experiment stations under
the Hatch Act of 1887.
Displacement ofFederal Funding by State Funding. In 1887, when the state agricultural
experiment station (SAES) ^stemwas first^ven formal federal iundingby passage ofthe Hatch Act,
at least 82 percent ofthe funding was fi"om the federal government. This share dropped dramatically
to 65 percent in 1900, 29 percent in 1960, and 26 percent in 1990. As the share offederal support
has declined, the share of state support has increased. The state funded share of SAES budgets
increased fi-om 20 percent in 1900 to 58 percent in 1960. Since then, the state share offunding has
decreased somewhat to 55 percent in 1980 and 1990, and further to 50 percent in 1995.
An important point about implementation ofstate fundingwas that it was provided through
institutional block grants or program grants to agricultural experiment stations or land-grant
universities, thus leaving the setting of directions and research programimplementation to local land-
grantor experiment station authority (HufRnan andEvenson). A major force behind the increase in
state funding wastherequirement instituted in 1935 of matching regular federal funding with other,
including state, funding. To receive regular USDA funding of the SAES, states were required to
match regular federal funds. An important effect of this requirement was to provide long-run
diversification in the SAES funding portfolio, which generated a very diversified public agricultural
research system compared to other countries.
Displacement of Regular Federal Funding by Competitive Grant Programs. While
fimding for theUSDA has continued to beessentially all firom the federal government (USDA), the
4composition of the funding and mechanism for allocating federal fiinds to the SAES system has
changed (HufBnan and Evenson, pp. 21-23; Alston and Pardey, Ch. 2; Committee ontheFuture of
the Colleges of Agriculture in theLand-Grant University System, Ch. 6). Historically a legislated
formula for allocating federal appropriations to the SAES system was used. Initially all states
received equal appropriations, but theformula was modified over theperiod 1935-55 to depend on
eachstate's share of total U.S. farm population and total U.S. rural people.
•After strong encouragement from the National Research Council, the USDA initiated a
Competitive Grants Programs to finance a small share ofpublic agricultural research in 1977. With
serious federal budget deficit problems beginning in the 1980s, public pressuremounted to increase
scrutiny of the efficiency and social usefulness of all public expenditures. An outgrowthof pressure
has been greater interest in and emphasis on priority settingat the federal level. Arguments were
advanced that SAES formula funding did not adequately reward productivity (or penalize non-
producti\dty). One response was a substantially increase in funding for the National Research
Initiative (NRI) in 1986. Competition forNRI grants is open to all publicand private researchers.
In 1900, virtually all of the 64 percent of SAES funding from the national government came
in the form ofUSDA formula funds. By 1960, the share of SAES system funding coming from
regular USDA(CSRS or CSREES administered) sourceshad declined to 22 percent. By 1980, the
sharewas 17percentand declined fijrtherto about 15percent in 1990and 1995. In 1982, only3.3
percent of regular federal funds for SAES were distributed by competitive grants, but this share
increased to 8.7 percent in 1990 and 15.7 percent in 1995 (Huffman and Evenson; USDA). Hence,
the funding of agriculture research by regular or formula funds has been largely displaced by
competitive grant funding.
5Increased emphasis on private funding and public-private cooperation. Increasingly,
in the midst of budget crises, public agricultural research scientists have been encouraged be
administrators to pursue nontraditional sourcesoffunding such as agencies other than departments
of agriculture, private corporations, and commodity groups. Over the past two decades, SAES
scientists in the U.S. have turned increasingly to non-regular federal and private sector sources. In
1980, the shareofSAES^stem funding coming fromnontraditional federal government sources was
11 percent. Thesefimds weredistributed bytheUSDAmcontracts and cooperative agreements and
by the National Institutes ofHealth, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the National
Science Foundation, theU.S. DepartmentofHealth andHuman Services, the Public Health Service,
and other agencies primarily by competitive grants. This share increased to 12 percent in 1990 and
15 percent in 1995 (USDA).
Public agricultural scientists are increasingly being encouraged to obtain funding from private
corporations and producergroups, including cooperatives. Theprivatesector share ofSAES fiinding
was 7.0 percent in 1960, and increased to 9.2 percent in 1980 and 13 percent in 1995.
Summary. This brief account reveals that SAESfiinding has become increasingly diversified
first to state as well as federal sources, then to non-agricultural government sources and the private
sector. As this change has taken place, the traditional formula allocation mechanism ofboth federal
and state governments has been increasingly displaced by competitive grant funding both from the
USDA as well as other federal agencies and by the private sector.
Asymmetric Information and the Principal-Agent Problem ofAcademic Research
To understand the implications of current trends in public agricultural research funding and
management according to principal-agent theory, R&D must first be recognized as a productive
6process that has unusual attributes relative to the production process for manufactured goods. First,
the R&D payoffis most accurately measured by the "best" ofits scientists' outputs, rather than their
total output ofmodels, designs, inventions, plant or animal varieties, etc.
Second, the research production process issubject to a large amount ofex ante uncertainty.
This arises in large part because output is appropriately measured by the "best" rather than "total"
output. For example, much ofwhat is "discovered" may be ofno social value because itdoes not
improve upon existing innovations sufficiently tomerit practical application. On the other hand,
something new and ofsignificance may bediscovered that isnot anticipated.
Third, the payoff orvalue ofa research project ifoften unknown at the outset. Infact, the
ultimate value of someR&D discoveries may be largely unknown even at the conclusion of the
research projects that generated them. For example, more than sixty years after Atanasoffdiscovered
the electronic digital computer and twenty-five years after Cohen and Boyer discovered the basic
technique ofrecombinant DNA, society continues touncover new and valuable applications that add
totheir respective payoffs. Formany projects, however, the discovery ofparticular innovations, such
as a new and successful wheat variety, will have characteristics that lend themselves to credible
estimates of their value.
Fourth, asymmetric information exists in the relationship between scientists and their research
institutions or administrators. When a research or funding institution contracts with a scientist for
a research project, they can anticipate asymmetric information about the scientist's level of"effort"
or"hours ofworl^* ontheproject. This arises because monitoring scientists' effort or hours ofwork
isvery costly andmost likely ineffective. Even a scientist may beunable to measure the amount of
time devoted to thinking about a problem during casual or"non-working" hours (seeLadd). Clearly,
given ex ante uncertainty in the research production process, a scientist's effort or hours of work
7cannotbe accurately inferred from the outputproduced. This raises a "moral hazard" concern in
setting research incentives: scientists' effort may notbe subject to effective contracting because an
administrator may not be ableto verify that a scientist's effort hasmet the termsof a contract.
Principal-agent theory can provide insight into setting efiicient incentives and contracting
within organizations when the research administrator (the principal) and scientist (the agent)
antidpate asymmetry ofinformation about the scientist's effort (Holmstrom; Mas-Collel, Whinston,
andGreen, Ch 14). In general, this problem is typical whenever an administrator or principal hires
someone to take some action as an "agent" of the administrator when effective monitoring is not
possible. Furthermore, considerable empirical evidence exists that principals and agents in a wide
rangeofnonmarket circumstances are able to work out incentive schemes to mitigate the problems
caused by asymmetric information and uncertainty (e.g. seeHolmstrom;Holmstrom andMilgrom).
Modeling Research Incentives with Uncertain PayofTs
Before assessing implicationsof recent trends in agricultural research, we sketch the basic model.
First, the research administratoris assumed to observe the research payoff at the end ofa project, to
compensate scientists for their effort, possibly with a compensationpackage includinga fixed salary
and a performance incentive, and to be risk neutral about R&D payoffs.^ For the purposeof this
paper, a research project is an attempt to develop a particular innovation or an annual contract to
conduct research in a particular area. The administrator's objective is to maximize expected R&D
payoff net of scientists' compensation.
Second, scientists are assumed to obtain utility from income, disutility from effort or work,
to be risk averse, and to have a reservation utility (associated with activities that are not under the
control of the research administrator). More specifically, each scientist (denoted by the subscripti)
8isassumed to have a quadratic cost of effort, c-Xe;) = kjCiVl (which generates a positive-sloped effort
schedule with respect to compensation) where e; is effort, to have constant absolute risk aversion <!);,
to have a fixed certainty-equivalent reservation utility (^j), and to choose effort on research to
maximize individual expected utility subject to attaining at leastthe reservation utility.
Third, each sdentist isassumed to work alone (to avoid team or easy-rider problems) and to
undertake one project that produces exactly one indivisible unit ofoutput, butwith random quality
depending on his effort. Hence, the research output is one-dimensional. For notational simplicity,
the non-stochastic component ofthe production process is assumed identical across scientists — an
assumption that is easily relaxed later —so the quality index can besimply defined as effort plus
random components. To examine theimplications of random quality, we let
(1) yi= ei+ €i + 6
where yj is quality ofresearch produced by scientist i, Gj is ascientist-specific random component with
zero mean and variance and 6 is a random component affecting all scientists withzeromean and
variance The scientist-specific random term may represent the effects of individual ability,
creativity and efSciency of mental processes (Ladd). The common shock might represent
unanticipated problems associated with the particular innovation toward which all the scientists'
efforts are directed, or it could represent unanticipated exogenous advances in the public stock of
knowledge during the research project. Assuming that and 6 are uncorrelated, the variance of
research output is the summation of the two variances, wf = of + of (note that ifthe two are
correlated, a suitable redefinition can make them uncorrelated).
Theeffort level, e;, is the source ofasymmetric information. It is unobservable to the research
administrator but treated as observable to the scientist. Research quality, y„ is assumed to be
observable to both the administrator and scientist but only at the end ofthe research project. We
9permit more than one scientist towork independently on identical research projects, but only the
highest quality output contributes to theadministrator's R&D payoff. This might arise through the
publication process where an editor publishes the "best" paper on a topic given that it adds
significantly to the state ofknowledge, orfarmers use only the crop variety or animal breed that has
the "best" anticipated performance.
Optimal Compensation of Public Research Scientists
An important research policy question is: What istheoptimal scientist compensation scheme and how
does it depend on characteristics of scientists and research projects? To convey somebasic results
about optimal compensation and the associated R&D payoff, we initially consider contracting
between a research administrator (or fiinding agency) and onescientist. Accordingto principal-agent
theory, when contracting isrepeated many times and theagent has discretion in actions including the
level andtiming of eflFort, the structure of theoptimal pay scheme is linearin the observedprincipal's
payoff (Holmstrom andMilgrom; Levitt). Hence, we consider Pay Scheme I consisting of two
parts: (i) a guaranteed payment, ttj, that is independent of the observed R&D payoff, and (ii) an
incentive payment that amounts to a positive share, Pj„ of the observed R&Dpayoff,
(2) Wi=cti + Piyi.
A larger p; implies a "higher powered" incentive scheme. Substituting equation (1) into (2), the
structure of this pay scheme is linear in the scientist's effort,
(3) Wi(ei) = ai + Piei + Piei + Pi8.
Equation (3) depicts how ex ante uncertainty in the research production process is transmitted into
ex ante wage uncertainty for the scientist. From equation (3), the expected wage conditional on
2 2effort is E(Wi) = cq + ft q and thewagevariance is V(vf) ~ Pj Wj • Where the scientist's utility is
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Ui(ei) =Ui*[Wi(ei) - Ci(ei)], the scientist's expected utility maximization problem is
MaxE[Ui(ei)] = + Pa - .Sk^ei^ - 0)^^
for which first order conditions imply theoptimal effort choice, e*= P/lq.-
With one scientist, the optimal compensation scheme for the administrator is obtained by
choosing and P to maximize the administrator's expected R&D payoff net of scientist's
compensation subject tofi) the sdentist allocating effort tomaximize his expected utility and (ii) the
resulting certdnty-equivalent utility being at least as large as the scientist's certainty-equivalent
reservation utility Hj,
(4) Max E[ei* -Wi(ei*)] = ei* - ot; - Pje* s.t. E[Ui(ei)] ^ H;.
«i.Pi
Note that conditioning the administrator's problem insures that the scientist vwll be offered a
compensation package that he will accept. Inour model, it is unproductive for the administrator to
offer a compensation scheme that the scientist will reject because the administrator's expected payoff
iszero when thescientist rejects his compensation package, i.e., e = 0.Kuhn-Tucker conditions (or
direct examination) reveala boundary solution, E[Ui(ei)] = \i„ implying
(5) a; = ^i-.5(Pjy/k, + .5(t)i(Pr)V-
Substituting (5)into (4)and maximizing with respect to pj, or substituting (5) into the corresponding
first-orderconditionfor P|, reveals the optimal scientist performance incentive,
(6) pr =—I ^
1 +(t),kj(Oi
which,when substituted into (5), gives the optimalguaranteed payment,
<t>ikiCof - 1
. +
2ki(l +
With this optimal pay scheme, some notable results follow: First, the administrator
2'
11
compensates the scientist for effort and provides partial insurance against income risk from ex ante
income uncertainty. With asymmetric information, the administrator does not provide full insurance
because it would create amoral hazard problem for the administrator the scientist would be fully
insured agdnst income risk and, thus, tend toshirk on effort.
Second, the guaranteed component ofpay is positively related to the scientist sreservation
utility Hi, but the reservation utility has no impact on the incentive component ofpay.
TMrd, as the riskiness ofthe research process increases, i.e., increases, the importance of
the incentive component ofpay relative to the guaranteed component decreases. The optimal pay
guarantee is increasing (decreasing) in riskiness of the research process if (IJikjOi^ <(>) 3. Thus, high
risk, high risk aversion and/or high opportunity cost of time is sufficient to cause the guaranteed
payment to increase in research risk. If research is infinitely risky ((Oj^ - «), then p* =0, and the
optimal pay scheme is aguaranteed or fixed wage equal to the certainty-equivalent reservation utility
(andW; = ttj* = Hi).
Fourth, when scientists are heterogenous in their reservation utility, degree ofrisk aversion,
opportunity cost of effort, or riskiness of research output, the optimal pay scheme differs across
scientists. The incentive-performance factor is higher for a scientist with less risk aversion, lower
opportunity cost of effort, and lower scientist-specific research risk. The guaranteed component of
the wage is higher for scientists who have a larger reservation utility (e.g., higher salary offers
elsewhere). The guaranteed component is also higher (lower) for ascientist with higher risk aversion
if (t)ikiti)i^ <(>) 3, and for ascientist vnih higher opportunity cost ofeffort if(^ikitOj^ <(>) 1.78.
To examine these implications further, note that the expected R&D payofffor the research
administrator after payingwages is
12
(7) =(1 - Pi')ei* - < = ^
2ki(l +(t>ik.fof)
and theexpected wage ofthe scientist is
(8) E(wj) =< +Pfe; = ^ +Hi-
2ki(l +<t)ikiWi)
These expressions reveal, not surprisingly, that aresearch administrator is better off contracting with
asdentist that has low research risk, low risk aversion, and low opportunity cost ofeffort. Also, the
scientist who has these characteristics fares better in terms ofexpected compensation. Perhaps, the
result that scientists with low opportunity cost and low risk earn greater compensation is surprising,
but it is explained by the fact that more is traded away for purposes of risk avoidance by those with
high opportunity cost and high risk aversion. Among the pool oftalent represented by scientists, at
least two of these three attributes (research risk, risk aversion, and opportunity cost) are likely
negatively correlated, which adds to the research administrator's dilemma ofchoosing scientists. The
implications for research institutions where changes in employment are infrequent (research
institutions with permanent employees and universities with tenure systems) is that hiring decisions
are crucial and potentially the most crucial element ofsuccessful and efficient R&D administration.
In this model, an increase in ex ante R&D payoffuncertanty, say due to an increase in the
variance ofthe common shock causes the scientist to allocate less effort to the research project
which reduces the expected quality of research and the expected R&D payoff. Because of
asymmetric information regarding effort and incomplete insurance against the scientist sincome risk,
the scientist's expected compensation is also reduced. Furthermore, the expected R&D payoff"net
ofscientists compensation is reduced. Thus, in this model where an optimal compensation policy is
in place and the research administrator employs only one scientist per research project (i.e., there are
13
no duplicate projects), it is never optimal for the administrator to take actions that will increase ex
ante uncertainty for scientists unless they lead to counter veiling effects onresearch quality.
One research policy change where the scientist could perceive increased risk iswhere formula
funding isreplaced by competitive grant funding. Forexample, this change might increase the risk
that a scientist will receive adequate funding to carry out or complete planned research. An increase
in perceived riskwould lead a scientist to allocate less effort to research, which in turn lowers
expected quality and expected net R&D payoff from research. Thus, any switch from formula
funding to competitive grant funding should beverified to have a sufficiently positive effect on project
quality, for example byweeding outfrivolous projects or charmeling fimds to higher quality scientists
(accounting for imperfect correlation between quality of project proposals and ultimate research
discovery quality), to offset the effectof increased risk perceived by scientists.
Duplication ofEffort
Another important issue is whether a research administrator should employ multiple scientists
working independently on the same research objective. In a certainworld, if a research administrator
were interested in minimizing the cost of an innovation (with given quality), he would hire only one
scientist. Employing a secondscientist to do the same work doubles the cost of the research. Adding
individual uncertainty and asymmetric information to the discovery process, however, an
administrator can increase the ^ected R&Dpayoffin two ways by adding duplicative scientists and
efforts.
First, when the output of two scientists comes from overlapping statistical quality
distributions, adding a second scientisthas a benefit from the "sampling effect." The research payoff
to the administrator can be viewed as the expectedvalue of the maximumofmultiple draws from the
14
quality distribution. Adding a second draw increases the expected value ofthe maximum payoff
(Gumbel). The margmal payofiFbenefit from the sampling efifect is mcreasing in and decreasing
in the correlation between and e2(as isclear below). The sampling efifect has no value when the
random component ofsdentists' research output is perfectly positively correlated. Hence, the benefit
ofthe sampling effect reduces to amarginal expected cost and return comparison.
Second, adding another scientist towork on an identical research project may be an optimal
action by aresearch administrator because, in an en\Tronment with imperfect information, the second
scientist may provide useful mformation about relative performance that can be used in the optimal
pay scheme ofthe first scientist, thus partially mitigating the moral hazard problem. This is the
"insurance effect" of adding a second scientist.
To see that adding a second scientist can have positive value, consider Pay Scheme 11 where
scientist i receives compensation according to the linear structure,
(9) Wi(yi ,yj) = a; + P-yi + YiYj, i = 1,2,
where for simplicity ofnotation throughout j =2 ifi= 1, and j = 1ifi = 2. This pay scheme has three
components: (1) awage guarantee, 0^, fii) an incentive component based on personal research quality,
Yi, and (lii) a comparison standard due to outside information regarding research quality ofthe other
scientist, Where the quality of each scientist's research follows equation (1), the expected wage
conditional on effort is E(w^ = O; + +YjCj and the wage variance is V(Wi) = + 2PiYiPi)
where Pi = If scientists have identical research risk (o^ = then p; = pj = p is the
correlation ofquality between sdentists. Each scientist has an expected utility maximization problem
ofthe form
MaxE[Ui(ei)] = «; + Pa + y^ej - .Sk^e^^ - .5(t)M'(P ' +Y'+
Taking the actions of others as given to find a Coumot-Nash equilibrium, the optimal effort choice
15
for eachindividual scientist is againq* = P|/lq.
With the introduction of a second scientist, the administrator's payoff depends on the
manmum qualityofresearch output over the two scientists. The research administrator maximizes
the expected R&D payoff with respect to i = 1,2, assuming each scientist maximizes
expected utility and must receive at least the certainty-equivalent reservation utility
(10) Max E
Bj, pj,Yj; i =U
niax(yr. yO - E («i +Piyi* +YiYj') S.t. E[Ui(ei)] ^ i = 1,2,
where yi = + Cj + 6. Whilemax(>^ , ) has no closed form representation, results fromLevitt
imply that
(11) E[max(yi*, y^*)] = e/ + A(ei* - e,*, o,^ Oj^)
where
2a^A a^A a^A , 2a^A ^= kj —- a 0,(12a)
'aPi
. aA _
ae;
aA
ae; ^ap2
(12b)
, aA
k, =
'ap,
aA
ae;
aA
dQ2
. aA
• aP.
apt d(ey ap:'2
2 -n * • J _2 2
Kuhn-Tucker conditions again reveal a boundary solution, E[Ui(ei)] = H;, i.e., the administrator will
notpay a larger guaranteed component than necessary to retain a scientist's services, which implies
(13) a; = - .5(p;)^/ki - + (Yi')' + 2p;Yi>i].
The Optimal Relative Performance Incentive
The introduction of a second scientist adds the opportunity to compensate scientists on the
basis ofrelative performance. Substituting (13) into (10) and maximizing vwth respect to Yi reveals
that the optimal choicefor the relative performance incentive is
(14) Yi'=-PiPr-
16
Thus, when multiple scientists are funded to work on the same research objective they are
compensated on arelative performance basis where the strength of the performance comparison
depends on the extent to which common random components effect research outputs. In one
extreme, ifthe entire random component is common to both scientists (a^ =0which implies pj—1),
then the non-fixed component ofcompensation is proportional to the quality difference in research
output (Yi' = -PD- In the other extreme, if the random components of research quality are
uncorrelated among scientists (p^ =0which implies p; =0), then there is no insurance information
from adding the second scientist and, thus, no comparison incentive is used (y' =0).
Optimal Asymmetry ofScientist Compensation Schemes
We now consider whether scientists should face the same or different pay schemes when two
scientists are assigned the same task. Substituting both (13) and (14) into (10) for i—1,2, and
maximiidng with respect to and P2 obtains first-order conditions that imply
i+k,aA/ap; i-k^aA/ap" , k^aA/ap'
(15) Q ~ ——• ' &nQ P2 ~ •
1+(|)jkj(Oi(l - Pi) 1+(I)ikjCOi(l - Pi) 1+*t>2^"2(l " P2)
These conditions are necessary but not sufficient because concavity does not hold (Levitt).
Comparison ofthe results in (15) reveals that the incentive payments can be asymmetric for
several reasons including heterogeneity ofscientists with respect to risk aversion, opportunity cost,
and/or risk of research quality. Interestingly, however, asymmetric mcentive payments may be
optimal evenwhen these attributes are the same among scientists. For example, ifki =kj, =4)2.
and 01^ = 02^ then and p, = p2 which implies fi-om (15) that
(16)
l-2k.aA/8P2
Pi - P2 = ; r Pi + P2 =1+(l)ikiCof(l - p?) 1+<t)ikiof(l - pf)
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Comparing this latter result to (6) reveals that agreater total effort is expended in the two-scientist
problem than in the single-scientist problem. Levitt's results for this case fiirther show that a
symmetric incentive scheme is preferred ifand only ifpj <1and
^ 1+c|)iki(o?(l - p?)
2k,
Thus, aresearch administrator will find oflfering different compensation schemes to identical scientists
advantageous when the second-order effects ofincentives on the sampling effect are large.
The intuition ofthis result isevident by rearranging the first relationship in (16),
(17) (P; - PD[1 +4>ikiWf(l -p?)] =1-2kJ^A/ap^
The lefi;-hand side of equation (16) represents the marginal cost to the administrator of increasing
asymmetry in the incentive component ofthe compensation schemes, holding total effort ofthe two
scientists (e =e,+^2) constant. The expected total wage bill is increasing in asymmetry for agiven
total effort because ofconvexity in the opportunity costs ofeffort for scientists, i.e., the administrator
must incur more cost to induce amarginal unit ofeffort fi"om ascientist who is already working hard
than one who is working less.
The right-hand side of equation (17) represents the marginal expected benefit to the
administrator ofincreasing asymmetry while holding total effort constant. The first right-hand term
represents the direct benefit from increasing the first scientist's effort while the second right-hand
term reflects the reduction in value of the sampling effect as a result of the greater incentive
difference. Thus, as the incentive differential widens, the marginal value of the sampling effect
decreases. Although the second scientist faces a lower powered incentive, the probability is still
positive that the lower effort ofthe second scientist will produce the "best" output. With stochastic
production, "good luck" combined with low effort can lead to ahigher quality output than the high
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efifort ofthe first scientist with "bad luck " This probability, however, declines as the incentive and
effort differentials widen. Fui^ermore, evenwhen the output ofthe low-effort scientist is dominated
by the output of the high-effort scientist, the low-effort scientist has value to the administrator as
information about relative performance given asymmetric information on effort.
These results illuminate the key economic issues behind an administrator's decision to employ
one versus multiple scientists working independently on identical research objectives. The
administrator chooses the number ofscientists that maximizes expeaed R&D payoffnet ofthe total
wage bill. The sampling-effect advantage of using multiple scientists is increasing in the ex ante
uncertainty ofthe research production process, assuming production shocks across scientists are
not too highly correlated. The administrator's benefit fi-om the "sampling effect" of an additional
scientist is decreasing in this correlation and is zero when shocks across scientists are perfectly
positively correlated (i:e., p; =1). The insurance effect advantage of adding an additional scientist
because of information contained in a second scientist's research output, however, is increasing in
this correlation. It isofno value when output across scientists isuncorrelated (p; = 0).
In effect, ifyj contains new information about the first scientist's level ofeffort, then yz can
beused to induce more effort and, thus, attain higher quality output and increased expected R&D
payoff. Hence, the administrator receives amarginal expected payofffor the "insurance effect" of
Pay Scheme II relative to Pay Scheme I. The economic issue behind the insurance effect of
employing aseemingly redundant scientist reduces to acomparison of the marginal expected cost of
theadditional information and marginal expected return fi*om it.^
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Impact of Duplication on Scientist Compensation
An interesting issue, especially to the first scientist, iswhether his optimal performance incentive will
be higher with one or two scientists assigned to the same task. When theoutput across scientists
working onidentical tasks isnottoohighly correlated, the optimal power of the incentive component
of the first scientist's compensation will be higher when only onescientist is assigned to the task.
Two effects expldn the difference in (15) and (6). Fu-st, the "insurance effect" of relative
performance evaluation disappears when only one scientist is employed and makes inducing extra
effort more expensive because of the positive marginal cost of each scientist's effort to the
administrator. Comparing (15) and (6), this effect is represented by p; * 0. Second, the "sampling
efiect" associated with multiple draws from the same distribution disappears whenonlyone scientist
isemployed. Comparing (15) and (6), this effect isrepresented by kjSA/Spj* * 0.
To consider the expected impact ofadding multiple scientists on scientist compensation, first
note using (13) and (14) that the expectedcompensation for each scientist is
(18) E(Wi) = a*+ Pi'ei* + y'e- = n, + .SCPiY/ki + .5(t)i(P')V(l - p;^).
Substituting (15) into (18) yields
[1 - k,aA/ap']^ ^ ^ [k,aA/ap"]^
E(wj) = + and E(w2) = + ^2•
2kjl - p?)] 2k,[l +(l)jlc,co^(l - p^)]
Comparing to (7), the first scientist maybebetteror worse off when a second scientist is added. The
first scientist will receive higher expected compensation if the relative incentive effect (represented
by the correlation coefficient) is stronger, but will receive less if the sampling effect (represented by
kjSA/^Pj*) is stronger. Comparing thetwocases, anadministrator with only one scientist only needs
to compensate a singlescientist for extra effort. In the two-scientist case, he must compensate both
scientists for extra effort but receives the benefit of the effort from only one ofthem (the one with
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the "best" output). With ahigher-powered compensation incentive in the single-scientist case, the
optimal guaranteed compensation will be lower because the administrator needs to offer more
incentive to offset lack of information about whether effort is appropriate (the moral hazard
explanation). The first scientist will lose with the addition ofasecond scientist in the case where
elimination ofstoking is the main purpose ofadding the additional scientist. On the other hand, the
first scientist will gain in those cases where the primary impact is healthy competition among
' scientists (the sampling effect explanation).
Some additional insight is revealed by considering fiirther the special case where scientists
have identical opportunity cost fiinctions and the administrator chooses to offer identical mcentives.
In this case, afirst scientist is better offwhen another scientist is added if pi^ >(3/4) +(3/4ki4>it^i^)-
This condition is less likely to hold ifopportunity cost, risk aversion, and/or research risk are low,
and will not hold in any case if <.75. This case suggests that duplication of efforts is likely to
lower compensation ina wide variety ofcases.
The Choice toEmploy Multiple Scientists on the Same Research Objective
To determine whether the administrator is better off employing more than one scientist on the same
research objective, the optimal expected R&D payoffmust be determined in the multiple- scientist
case and compared with-the single-scientist case. Substituting into (10) and using (11) reveals the
expected net R&D payoff for the two-scientist case,
(19) Ej =-^[1 +VA/aPj] - ^[k^aA/aPj'] - (i, - +a.
2k^ ^
While this expression is quite difficult to compare with (7) in general, auseful special cases
gives insight. Suppose, for example, that the administrator chooses to use asymmetric incentive
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scheme after correcting for differences in the opportunity cost ofeffort. For example, suppose the
opportunity cost ofeffort represents the expense ofresearch facilities and support that must be
allocated to finance a scientist's effort and theadministrator chooses to reward effort relative to the
scale ofopportunity costs, i.e., p/lq are equalized across scientists. In this case, use of(1 lb) in (19)
implies
(20) IIj = + A.
21CJ1 +(j),k,coJ(l - p?)]
The first term of(20) is identical to (7) except for the correlation which reduces the denominator and
increases theadministrator's payoffdue to the relative performance incentive. The second term of
(20) is identical to (7) but the third term represents an addition reservation certainty equivalent that
must be paid to an additional scientist. Finally, the last term represents the sampling effect of
employing two scientists, ffboth scientists have similar research risk^ then A- .564 fi-om (1 lb).
Thus, adding a second scientist is preferred if andonly if
n, - ^p ^ +.5640, >0.
2k,[1 +(l),k.0)?(l - p?)] 2k,(1 +
Thus, a second scientist ismore likely to be preferred ifthe opportunity cost of effort is low, risk
aversion is low, the correlation of research quality ishigh, and thecertainty-equivalent reservation
utility of the second scientist is low.
Value ofDecentralized Research Institutions
When an administrator chooses multiple scientists to work independently on the same task, further
advantages may be gained by encouraging risk taking and trying new approaches by some of the
scientists, wWch increases thevariance of their output. The results of this paperhave two important
22
appUcations in this context. First, the framework can be re-interpreted to apply to the case where
agents are mdividual research institutions and the administrator is, say, the federal government. Thus,
duplication ofefforts among research institutions may be practical and desirable.
Second, the framework ofthis paper has important implications with respect to two common
concems regarding the competitive grants process. One criticism ofcompetitive grants processes is
that funds are typically distributed by asmall committee or according to the recommendations of such
a small committee. Because a small committee is typically more narrow in its perceptions of
"appropriate research approaches" than the scientific community as awhole, such a process may
result in anarrow range ofresearch perspectives among funded projects. This narrowing most likely
reduces the value ofthe sampling effect. Ifthe sampling effect is the primary reason for research
duplication, then agreater sampling eflfect and thus greater R&D payoffare likely obtained by fiinding
scientific approaches that cover the widest possible range for achieving adiscovery. On the other
hand, ifthe information effect is the primary reason for research duplication, then restricting the range
of research approachesmaybe best.
Another criticism ofthe competitive grants process is that it tends to fund those projects that
have more immediate and thus more certain payoffs that will demonstrate eariy productivity of
research administrator's programs. Where many ofthe players are risk averse, a tendency toward
certainty has advantages. However, in the framework ofthis paper the risk averse players are the
scientists; their risk aversion would presumably be reflected in the research they propose. On the
other hand, when research efforts are duplicated, administrators can benefit by funding more risky
projects ifthe sampling effect donates the information effect [ifAadds more to equation (20) than
pi^ takes away]. Thus, choosing more risl^ projects is preferred, other things equal, ifthe correlation
among research outputs is low.
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As anotherapproachto mcreasing the valueof the sampling effect, an administrator maywant
to limitinteractionsamong scientistsbecause interactions tend to lead to similar research approaches
and thus increase the correlation across scientists' output. The administrator is better off limiting
interactionprovided the increasedvalue ofthe sampling effect outweighs the increase in the wage bill
to compensate scientists for bearing greater risk and the benefits of knowledge enhancement by
exchange that might otherwise take place.
If having multiple scientists work in different institutions and locations on the same task
reduces the correlation of their outputs, then the value of the "sampling effect" increases thereby.
At the same time, the "insurance effect" of each administrator employing multiple scientists on the
same research objectivemay not be weakened if administrators can successfully share information on
the performance ofscientists. Additionally, although not reflected in the model, low morale problems
that tend to arise in public institutions from large differences in compensation schemes can be
mitigated by having large differences in compensation across research institutions but small intra-
institution differences. This line of reasoning suggests advantage to the multi-institutional
organizationofpublic agricultural research in the United States and Germany relative to the single-
institutional approaches ofFrance and Italy.
We also note that the benefits of the multi-institutional organization can be lost if excessive
communication amongadministrators leads to too much similarity ofdirection. That is, if individual
administrators each seek to minimize the cost of an innovation and thereby restrict individual
scientists to the sameresearch approach on the same research objective, thenmuch of the sampling
effect maybe lost (although the insurance effect is strengthened).
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Implications for Management ofResearch and Setting of Priorities
The possibihty that muhiple workers can be optimally employed to undertake duplicative tasks is
unique to R&D and similar activities. Such an approach is the antithesis ofoptimality in management
of typical industrial production problems. In industrial production, ex ante payoff uncertainty is
relatively low, output produced by workers on the same task is highly correlated, and asymmetric
information is not much ofa problem because shirking becomes quickly apparent in a well-known
production process that has been repeated many tunes, e.g., on an assembly line. More importantly,
in typicalindustrialproduction problems, output ofworkers is additive rather than determined by the
best among workers. These differences in the attributes ofR&D production relative to industrial
productionimply that different principles ofmanagement must be considered and that priority setting
and strategic planning must address different issues.
In industrial production, a carefully structured strategicplanand set ofpriorities are valuable
tools to management and can usually be implemented with simple compensation schemes. In
particular, they permit sound management of large or loosely structured companies. In research
management, however, plans and priorities are much less valuable unless carefully adapted to the
opportunity forimplementation when major considerations are exante uncertainty of output quality,
asymmetric information regarding effort, andwhere best ratherthan average output matters.
For example, given that effortisuriobservable andundirectable, a carefully structured set of
priorities is useless if not tied to observable payoffs and not implemented through a feasible
compensation scheme. These considerations suggest that priorities must be relatively general and
specified in terms of payoffs that are observable by the research administrator. Priorities must be
related to scienti^s' effort and consider thepossibility of discovery byscientists' efforts and results
moving in unanticipated directions. For example, ifincentives are specified too narrowly and do not
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take account of unanticipated peripheral discovery, the risk of the research to the scientist will be
higher than it needs to be and, thus, call forth less than opthnal effort. Thus, priority setting and
planning can provide only useful broad goals or general direction for the efforts of scientists. For
example, priority setting may be usefully linked to the compensation scheme by defining the attributes
ofimportance in evaluating the R&D payofTofconcern to the administrator (in a way that could be
specified in the compensation scheme), rather than listing the set of R&D discoveries that the
administrator would like to obtain (some ofwhichmaybe discovered in peripheral research).
Conclusions
The results of this paper have some basic implications for how best to transfer resources from
researchffinancing institutions to research-performing institutions and scientists. Typically, a research
institution or government agency operating on behalf of a political jurisdiction or clientele group
receives institutional, program, or formulafunding and the administrator must decide how to allocate
the fimds among other researchinstitutions or scientists. The leading alternatives are institutional or
program grants, research contracts, and peer-reviewed competitive grants. We consider the
economic efficiency ofeach.
Ifa research institution uses fimds to employ scientists, the principles ofoptimal contracting
imply that scientists should be compensated to conduct research consistent with the institution's
research payoflF. More specifically, the administrator should implement a partial incentive contract
with scientists that involves both anoptimal compensation guarantee and anoptimal performance
incentive. The performance incentive should bedefined by thecharacteristics thatmatter invaluing
the R&D payoflfto theinstitution. More basically, what matters in valuing theR&D payoffmay be
rooted inthevalues of thepolitical jurisdiction or clientele financing the institution. Scientists then
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exert the optimal level of effort and the research mstitution maximizes its expected R&D payoff net
of the wage bill for scientists.
In the case of research funding institutions (including those in the private sector) which
contract with sdentists and research institutions for research, the theory of contracting in this paper
implies that the optimal contract should have a quality-based incentive. Costs may also be an
important part ofthe contract to the extent they affect the scientist's opportunity cost. Particularly
for more basic research, incentives should be defined in terms ofbroad performance attributes that
reflectvalue ofthe research payoff to the funding institution rather than specifications ofa particular
innovation. Thus, the scientist can have more avenues available for attaining success, which reduces
riskiness of the project and induces increased effort. Alternatively, if the contract simply assures
"minimum cost," the scientisthas too strong an incentive to cut effort as well as cost, which reduces
quality and payoff.
Applying the principles of optimal contracting, thispaper shows that peer-reviewed and peer-
ranked competitive research funding is socially inefficient relative to optimal incentive contracts.
Competitive funding detracts fi-om research productivity because it adds to uncertainties faced by
scientists. Furthermore, if the standards or personal views of the decision making body are more
narrow, conservative, or short-sighted than thebroad scientific community, thenfunded research may
betoo similar or low-risk to capture an optimal sampling effect of duplicative research. Chubin and
Hackett summarize empirical evidence showing thatpeerreview allocation of research funds is quite
subjective. Bynature, the process ofpeer and panel recommendations onacceptable procedures for
attaining a project's objectives and on assessment of attainability of objectives tend to be too
conservative. This leads to a socially excessive correlation of output across scientists receiving
awards, thus reducing the value of the "sampling effect" on research payoff. This problem is
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esp^ally serious when research payoffs are very risky as in basic and pretechnology science research.
This paper also points out the value of the information effect which is strengthened by
similarity (correlation) of research output. However, theinformation effect isonly ofvalue as it is
incorporated into incentive schemes thatmduce higher quality research. Wesuggest that sufficient
duplication ofobjectives among research projects exists so that theinformation value ofduplication
is low compared to thesampling value. If so, then theinducement of similarity of research through
competitive funding has a detrimental effect when theultimate social payoffdepends onbest rather
than average quality of the research output.
The rationale for these conclusions is based on ex ante uncertainty in the research production
process and asymmetric information on scientists' effort. Crucial assumptions for practical
application are as follows. First, a research proposal has no direct value in the R&D payoffof a
project. Second, a peer^reviewed grant system ^ves an incentive only for the quality of the proposal
rather than for the ultimate researchoutput (the latterofwhich is observableonly after the award and
is imperfectly correlatedwith the former). This is a crucial flaw because, withuncertainty, no one
including the author of a proposal, knows what can be discovered. Alternatively, the obvious
incentive is to "promise a lot and deliver a little."
An additional problem with competitive grants is that they impose heavy externalities on
scientists and their employing institutions. The externalities are due to a system inwhich the funding
institutions typically do not explicitly finance all of scientists' time. If scientists receive no
compensation for proposal writing, or are compensated only for successflil proposals, then income
risk to scientists for undertaking research is increased. Alternatively, the incentive is to write
proposals for work that has alreadybeen partlycompletedbut not released, which distorts incentives.
Second, if scientists are compensated by their home institution for writing a proposal, then these
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resources likely comewith high opportunity cost (e.g., teaching time or alternative research). Third,
given asymmetric information about sdentists* effort, amore likely scenario is that effort planned and
compensated by already-funded projects will be redirected to proposal writing, thus reducing the
payoffto those projects. For example, significant scientist effort may be going into NRI and other
competitive proposal writing and evaluation that is being paid for by state-govemment-provided
institutional research grants. Fourth, the proposal evaluation and ranking process for competitive
grant programs consumes scientists' time that also is not compensated by research granting
institutions. This time has opportunity costs similar to proposalwriting. These externalities are
sometimes characterized as the transactions costs of scientists* time spent in writing and reviewing
project proposals (Just and Huf&nan, 1992; HufBnan andJust 1994). The sizeof these inefGciencies
is increasing in the share ofproposals that are not fUnded.
Given the principles developed in this paper, we suggest that social efficiency of public
agricultural research is likely to be best captured by formula, program, and institutional funding of
diverse researchinstitutions that offeroptimal incentives to the scientists they employ. Short research
proposals (e.g., a few pagesin length) andcovering reasonably long periods oftime (e.g., 3-5 years)
serve sufficiently to permit administrators to monitor, review, and manage— if the more crucial
steps are taken to implement optimal incentives based on attributes of value to the institution.
Researchproposalsneedto state the objectives sufficiently to allow the decisionmaker to verify that
anticipated payoffs fit the criteria that are used in valuing the R&D payoff of the institution.
Describing details about approaches may be wasteful and even counter-productive if it tempts
decisionmakers to limit scope and approaches. In this way, scientists' effort and time for reviewmg
and evaluating could be allocated exclusively to assessing the quality of research output, e.g.,
reviewing manuscripts for publication and evaluating research payoff. Interestingly, this
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characterization ofanoptimal system appears to bemuch like the traditional agricultural experiment
station system.
By comparison, the funding ofpublic agricultural research intheUnited States has moved
substantially toward competitive grant funding and away from formula and program funding over the
past few decades. The premise isthat competitive funding raises (average) research output quality.
* Before this trend continues further, a careful assessment seems prudent to determine whether the
t claimed merits ofcompetitive fimding outweigh the detractions from research productivity illustrated
conceptually intlus paper. Several critical questions must beanswered. Howmuch is the quality of
the best research raised by eliminating poorer scientists andprojects? How do thesegains, if they
exist, compare to themagnitude ofquality lost through themechanisms highlighted inthispaper. The
answers to these questions depend crucially on the effectiveness of the competitive evaluation
process, thebreadth ofperception of funding panels, thecorrelation of quality of research proposals
with ultimate research output quality, the extent of ex ante uncertainty in research quality, the
asymmetry of information between scientists andflinders, and the extentto which research payoffs
depend onbest versus average quality of research output. None of these issues have received much
' empirical attention.
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Footnotes
^ A riskneutral preference for administrators canbejustified by thinking of them asmanaging
a large portfolio ofprojects. The assumption ofrisk neutrality canbemodified biit at significant cost
in additional complexity of the presentation but little change the basic conceptual conclusions
provided scientists are more risk averse than administrators.
^ As a utility fiinction for scientists (the agents), we use the one that has attracted the most
attention in the principal-agent literature (seeMas-Colell, Whinston, andGreen, p. 479-80).
^ We assume thejoint distribution ofy, and yj exists and is represented by f(yj, \e^, Cj) =
f2(y2lyi.ei,e2)fi(yi|ei,e2)by the theory of conditional probability. IfS(slx,q,^) f2(y21 ^2)'
i.e., , f2(y2lyi>®i>®2) depends on q , then y is not a sufficient statistic foq e which means th^ y
contains "new information" about e^ that is not contdned in jj. This is the condition in which
"outsideinformation" is usefiil in an optimalpay schemefor the first scientist (see Holmstrom;Mas-
Collel, Whinston, and Green, Ch. 14).
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